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PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING, DUE PROCESS, AND THE 
JUDICIAL ROLE 
INTRODUCTION 
We know their stories: Joel Tenenbaum, a college student, and Jammie 
Thomas-Rasset, a young mother, caught in that act now so ubiquitous among 
young people—unlawful peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing.1 Both are seemingly 
tales of lone, luckless consumers being crushed by the monolithic record labels 
whose copyrights they’ve infringed. One can undoubtedly feel sorry for them. 
Their lives have been permanently uprooted by a controversy that is far larger 
than either of them. Popular media have recently taken up their cause and 
blamed the record companies for their merciless assaults.2 
Despite the heartstrings so plaintively plucked, there is a reason for their 
suffering—copyright infringement. Major record labels claim they are suing 
infringers like Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset not in a vindictive swipe at 
consumers, but as a last-ditch effort to stem the overwhelming tide of 
infringement facilitated by P2P software.3 These two cases, Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment v. Tenenbaum4 and Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset,5 are 
the most prominent examples of the record companies’ efforts against 
individual infringers. The issue in these cases that most concerns scholarly, 
judicial, and popular authorities is the enormous size of the statutory damage 
 
 1. See KATHRYN C. MONTGOMERY, GENERATION DIGITAL: POLITICS, COMMERCE, AND 
CHILDHOOD IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 1–2 (2007) (discussing young people’s embrace of the 
internet and illegal music file-sharing). 
 2. See, e.g., Jeff Leeds, Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, at 
C4; Anjali Bhat, Common Sense Won in the Tenenbaum Decision, PUB. KNOWLEDGE POL’Y 
BLOG (July 12, 2010), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/common-sense-prevailed-tenen 
baum-decision; Corynne McSherry, Judge Cuts Damages in Sony v. Tenenbaum, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. DEEPLINKS BLOG (July 9, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/07 
judge-cuts-damages-sony-v-tenenbaum. But see Thomas Sydnor, The “Lessigation” of Copyright 
Scholarship: A Review of Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of 
Reform (Part I), PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND. BLOG (July 1, 2009, 4:43 PM), 
http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/07/the_lessigation_of_copyright_scholarship_a_review.html. 
 3. See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text. 
 4. 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 660 
F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 5. 799 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. Minn. 2011), vacated, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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awards leveled against the defendants.6 Despite the fact that these awards were 
well within the Copyright Act’s range for statutory damages,7 the trial courts in 
both cases struck down the awards on substantive due process grounds, finding 
them unconstitutionally excessive.8 Commentators have likewise railed against 
the size of the awards, seconding the trial judges’ fear that the unfair 
excessiveness of these awards reached a constitutional magnitude.9 
The First Circuit, after hearing the appeal in Tenenbaum,10 vacated the trial 
court’s decision to strike down the statutory award on due process grounds.11 
While it did so without reaching the constitutional issues in play,12 it laid them 
out in a manner that implied the circuit’s views on those issues.13 The court 
was not bashful in pointing out that the record companies have legitimate 
interests to protect in suits like Tenenbaum.14 
This Comment seeks to ground the debate over the excessiveness of the 
awards in the Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset cases. Taking the dispute out of 
the theoretical clouds will enable the copyright regime to adapt to future 
changes in the landscape of content creation and dissemination. Through this 
analysis, I seek to balance both the concerns of copyright owners in the face of 
contemporary internet culture and the struggles of that same culture to shuffle 
off restrictions that inhibit open, free access to creative content.15 
I will first look back at the purposes of the Copyright Act’s statutory 
damages provision and compare them to the peril faced by record companies in 
this age of internet dominance. From this analysis, I will show how 
 
 6. See, e.g., Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1001; Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 89; J. 
Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The 
Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 525, 526 (2004); Kate Cross, Comment, David v. Goliath: How the Record Industry 
is Winning Substantial Judgments Against Individuals for Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2010); Greg Sandoval, A Copyright Ruling No One Can Like, CNET 
NEWS (July 13, 2010, 12:08 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20010428-261.html. 
 7. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
 8. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1011; Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 116. 
 9. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A 
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 480 (2009); Jeffrey Stavroff, 
Comment, Damages in Dissonance: The “Shocking” Penalty for Illegal Music File-Sharing, 39 
CAP. U. L. REV. 659, 662 (2011). 
 10. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 11. Id. at 515. 
 12. See id. at 510–11. 
 13. See id. at 512–15. 
 14. See id. at 492. 
 15. News and forum sites like TorrentFreak are prime examples of groups that spearhead the 
popular call for fewer limitations on dissemination and reproduction on the internet. See, e.g., 
Rick Falkvinge, It’s Time to Go on the Offensive for Freedom of Speech, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 
22, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/its-time-to-go-on-the-offensive-for-freedom-of-speech-120 
122/. 
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constitutional smoke-and-mirrors16 cannot square with the plain truth of the 
matter: the plaintiff record companies have been damaged by the defendant 
infringers, and the Copyright Act’s statutory damages are crafted to remedy 
such cases—especially in the P2P infringement context. 
The right and the remedy are, of course, different things. I argue here that 
the right has clearly been violated and the remedy is at least constitutional, 
though perhaps undesirable. My deference to the Copyright Act’s plain 
language goes only so far as is necessary to uphold core principles of statutory 
construction and deference to legislative judgment. While I recognize content 
providers’ legitimate interests in copyrights on the internet, I support revision 
of the current statutory regime to better comport with modern societal and 
cultural norms.17 Fundamental conceptions of the internet and its place in 
contemporary lifestyle call for a keen editing eye. 
Part I will lay the groundwork for a more in-depth discussion of the issues 
involved in Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset by summarizing the development 
of modern copyright law, particularly statutory damages and their relation to 
the growth of the internet. Part II will then examine the two cases in detail, 
showing how and why the trial courts struck down the jury awards. Part III 
turns to the opinion of the First Circuit in Tenenbaum. There I will discuss 
implications visible in the court’s opinion that speak to the constitutional issues 
in that case. After identifying those implications, I will discuss how the 
purposes of copyright statutory damages support the First Circuit’s approach. I 
will also address a number of possible criticisms of the First Circuit’s 
reasoning based on modern normative considerations. 
While those criticisms raise definite concerns for the future of copyright, 
they do not undermine the proper disposition of the issues under the current 
statutory scheme. The proposed criticisms strike well beyond the scope of 
these two cases and beyond the judiciary’s power. Rather, these concerns 
reflect a need for legislative action. They suggest a reassessment of the 
copyright regime in light of the new challenges posed by the internet’s role as 
a vehicle for disseminating content. 
Ultimately, I applaud the Eighth Circuit, which followed the First Circuit’s 
approach in the appeal of Thomas-Rasset.18 Because of the complicated 
procedural history in Thomas-Rasset, the Eighth Circuit was forced to address 
the constitutional concerns raised therein. Though the First Circuit did not 
 
 16. See generally Colin Morrissey, Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant 
Constitutional Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3059 (2010) (analyzing the debate over whether the looser Williams standard 
or the stricter Gore standard applies to due process review of statutory damage awards under the 
Copyright Act, and finding that Williams is the correct test). 
 17. See infra notes 176–85 and accompanying text. 
 18. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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actually decide the constitutional issues underlying the case, it laid out the 
appropriate standards. With this persuasive authority at its disposal, the Eighth 
Circuit upheld the statutory damage award against Thomas-Rasset.19 The 
interests of the record companies are viable, and core jurisprudential concerns 
require that Congress, and not the judiciary, reform the copyright regime to 
better serve modern norms. 
I.  COPYRIGHT AND STATUTORY DAMAGES 
At its most fundamental level, copyright protects the public interest in the 
creation and dissemination of works of art.20 It does so by providing economic 
incentives to creators that encourage them to innovate and author new works.21 
These incentives include certain exclusive rights to the use of their works,22 
which authors hold for specified time periods.23 The Copyright Act enshrines 
these rights and provides remedies for copyright owners when infringement 
occurs.24 
One such protection is the Copyright Act’s statutory damages provision.25 
History shows that statutory damages have always been an important part of 
enforcement of copyrights.26 They serve critical compensatory and punitive 
functions in contexts where actual damages cannot reliably serve those 
 
 19. Id. at 907. 
 20. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 
329 F.2d 541, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1964); C. T. Drechsler, Annotation, Extent of Doctrine of “Fair 
Use” Under Federal Copyright Act, 23 A.L.R. 3d 139, 168–69 (1969); see also Pamela 
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2569 (2009) (noting that the fair 
use doctrine promotes “the ongoing progress of authorship and knowledge creation,” which is a 
fundamental purpose of copyright law). 
 21. Jonathan Ingram, Protecting Hospital Ratings with Copyright Law, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 
217, 221 (2010) (“The principal theory behind copyright protection is one of incentive: by 
protecting a work, an incentive to create is fostered, which increases public access to useful 
knowledge.”). 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (2006). 
 23. See 17 U.S.C. § 302. This provision applies only to works created on or after January 1, 
1978. Id. There are other provisions regarding works created before that date and other special 
cases. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303–305. 
 24. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501–513. 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
 26. Thomas W. Kirby, Copyright Statutory Damages and Due Process Excessiveness: Why 
Gore and State Farm Punitive Damages Principles Do Not Apply, LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 
38, 40. The 1796 and 1909 Acts also contained statutory damages provisions. United States of 
America’s Memorandum in Defense of the Constitutionality of the Statutory Damages Provision 
of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) at 4, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 
1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-cv-1497). Though the amount of damages due under the Act 
changed over time, the notion of statutory damages as a method of redressing injury was never 
seriously questioned. See id. at 3–5 (discussing persistence of and changes to the Copyright Act’s 
statutory damages provision over time). 
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functions27—namely, in the P2P context.28 Statutory damages are particularly 
apposite to file-sharing because they are meant to obviate the need for pleading 
and proving compensatory damages, which can be difficult or impossible to 
discover.29 Once a plaintiff chooses to forgo compensatory damages and seek 
statutory penalties,30 the amount of actual damages becomes irrelevant.31 
Congress has provided increased protection for copyright holders in light 
of the growth of the internet.32 The ease with which one may access and 
illegally reproduce copyrighted works via the internet is astounding.33 As the 
technology facilitating infringement becomes more popular among casual 
internet users, the potential growth of this method of infringement reaches 
alarming proportions.34 
 
 27. Ben Sheffner, Due Process Limits on Statutory Civil Damages? Unprecedented Ruling 
in Copyright Case a Double-Edged Sword for Businesses, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL 
BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 6, 2010, at 1, 1–2; see also Daniel R. LeCours, Steering Clear of the 
“Road to Nowhere”: Why the BMW Guideposts Should Not Be Used to Review Statutory Penalty 
Awards, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 327, 345–46 (2010) (stating that statutory penalty schemes both 
deter unlawful conduct and compensate those harmed). 
 28. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 3 (1999) (discussing the purposes of the Copyright 
Damages Improvement Act of 1999, which include the need for stronger statutory penalties to 
combat infringement facilitated by advanced technologies, including computer software and 
internet applications). But cf. Lyombe Eko, American Exceptionalism, the French Exception, 
Intellectual Property Law, and Peer-to-Peer File Sharing on the Internet, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 95, 149–152 (2010) (comparing French and U.S. copyright regimes, finding that 
they both dislike P2P file-sharing infringement but pursue different methods of enforcing 
prohibitions against it). 
 29. Peter Thea, Note, Statutory Damages for the Multiple Infringement of a Copyrighted 
Work: A Doctrine Whose Time Has Come, Again, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 463, 465–66 n.7 
(1988). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Kevin M. Lemley, Eliminating Value of Infringement: An Economic Analysis of 
Internal Transactions and Indirect External Transactions in Software Infringement Cases, 45 
IDEA 425, 427 (2005). However, it should be noted that here the actual damages would likely be 
large. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see also In re Charter Commc’ns., Inc., 
Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that the DMCA was 
enacted in response to the rise of copyright infringement via P2P software). 
 33. See Jay Dougherty et al., Make It Available at Your Own Risk: A Look into Copyright 
Infringement by Digital Distribution, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2009) (pointing out that 
millions of P2P downloads occur each week); William Henslee, Money for Nothing and Music 
for Free? Why the RIAA Should Continue to Sue Illegal File-Sharers, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 13 (2009) (noting that P2P systems make downloads faster and more widely 
available). 
 34. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 923 (2005) 
(finding that “the probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering” in light of the 
widespread and growing use of P2P software); 63 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 1 (2001) 
(“While the basic human desire to get something for nothing, or nearly so, hasn’t changed in the 
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Responding to these concerns, in 1999 Congress increased the statutory 
penalty ranges and increased damages for both “willful” and “non-willful” 
infringers.35 However, much scholarly work has focused on the detrimental 
effects of huge statutory penalties for P2P copyright infringement, claiming 
they are unfair, excessive, and in contravention to the purposes of the 
Copyright Act.36 They often argue that the penalties’ excessiveness renders 
them unconstitutional.37 Typically, commentators apply the “guideposts” for 
reviewing punitive damages awards enunciated in BMW of North America, Inc. 
v. Gore.38 There, an automobile purchaser sued BMW, its American 
distributor, and the dealership for failure to disclose that the car he purchased 
had been repainted prior to sale.39 The Supreme Court found that punitive 
damages of $4,000,000 violated substantive due process in the face of 
compensatory damages of only $4,000.40 In the context of punitive damages, 
the Court reasoned that “[e]lementary notions of fairness . . . dictate that a 
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to 
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”41 
 
two decades of the personal computer, the Internet has altered the technological landscape, by 
making it possible for large numbers of users located almost anywhere to copy the same file at 
virtually the same time, with a high degree of reliability.”). 
 35. See Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106–160, 113 Stat. 1774. 
 36. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, Calibrating Copyright Statutory Damages to Promote 
Speech, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 52–53 (2010) (arguing that statutory damages, with wide and 
unpredictable ranges, “chill[]” speech, and should be reworked toward a more compensatory-
centered remedial regime that promotes free speech); Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 39 (2010) (concluding that the current copyright system does not uphold the 
values of creation and dissemination it purports to support since it gives too much power to 
“intermediaries” who limit the rights of both creator and readers for their economic gain); 
Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 9, at 509 (arguing that the compensatory, punitive, and 
deterrent purposes of statutory penalties do not comport with the current P2P cases, which often 
give arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and grossly excessive awards to plaintiffs). 
 37. See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 9, at 487–88. 
 38. 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996) (“Three guideposts, each of which indicates that BMW did 
not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might impose for 
adhering to the nondisclosure policy adopted in 1983, lead us to the conclusion that the $2 million 
award against BMW is grossly excessive: the degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the 
disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by Dr. Gore and his punitive damages 
award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases.”). 
 39. Id. at 563 & n.2. 
 40. Id. at 565, 585–86. 
 41. Id. at 574. 
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The inapplicability of this case’s standard is discussed elsewhere,42 and 
will be discussed in this Comment in the context of the Tenenbaum and 
Thomas-Rasset cases,43 but here I will note that the standard from St. Louis, 
Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Williams is the correct one.44 In 
Williams, the Court squarely addressed the issue of statutory damages when 
two sisters obtained statutory penalties of seventy-five dollars against a rail 
company that overcharged them by sixty-six cents for their tickets.45 It 
enunciated a highly deferential standard that judged due process 
reasonableness not by relation to actual damages (which “of course seem[ed] 
large” on the facts of that case), but by “due regard for the interests of the 
public, the numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need 
for securing uniform adherence to [the law].”46 These factors provide 
legislators with wide discretion to set statutory penalty rates.47 They are 
particularly apposite in the P2P context where the move toward mainstream 
use creates “numberless opportunities” for infringement.48 
Despite Congress’s foresight, the protections afforded under the current 
Copyright Act statutory damages regime are cold comfort to major record 
companies like those involved in Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset. Their 
revenues have been catastrophically damaged by the growth of P2P file-
sharing.49 Since illegally obtained copies of sound recordings are easy 
substitutes for the traditional purchase of identical copies (whether online or in 
compact disc form), record companies have alleged huge losses in record 
sales.50 The recording industry estimates its losses from P2P file-sharing in the 
 
 42. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1005–06 (D. 
Minn. 2011), vacated, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012); LeCours, supra note 27, at 357–58; 
Morrissey, supra note 16, at 3094; Sheffner, supra note 27, at 2–3. 
 43. See infra notes 74–83, 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 44. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66–67 (1919) (Statutory 
penalties are only violative of due process where the penalty is “so severe and oppressive as to be 
wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”). 
 45. Id. at 64. 
 46. Id. at 67. 
 47. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 512 (1st Cir. 2011); see also 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989) 
(noting that Williams applies to awards “made pursuant to a statutory scheme”); Zomba Enters., 
Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 587 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding the Williams standard 
“extraordinarily deferential”). 
 48. See infra note 94. However, the move toward mainstream infringement may in fact cause 
infringing P2P software applications to undermine themselves in the interests of convenience and 
speed. See infra note 187. 
 49. See Dougherty et al., supra note 33, at 4. 
 50. Stan J. Liebowitz, File-Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. 
& ECON. 1, 24 (2006). Liebowitz finds the correlation between declining sales and file-sharing 
piracy “[c]ommon sense.” See id. (“When given the choice of free and convenient high-quality 
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billions of dollars, accruing from a twenty-five percent decrease in record 
sales.51 This harm can only increase as P2P applications become more popular 
among internet users. The trend, moreover, is expected to and has begun 
spreading to other popular media industries such as film and television.52 
Before resorting to suits directly against individual infringers, the major 
record companies attempted to attack and dismantle the P2P applications 
themselves.53 First, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that the popular P2P application Napster could likely be found liable 
under the theories of contributory infringement and vicarious liability.54 The 
record companies next attacked Grokster, a successor program that operated 
very similarly.55 Thus, the P2P applications that facilitated individual users’ 
infringement could not escape their clear violations of the record companies’ 
 
copies versus purchased originals, is it really a surprise that a significant number of individuals 
will choose to substitute the free copy for the purchase?”). 
 51. Sanjay Goel et al., The Impact of Illegal Peer-to-Peer File Sharing on the Media 
Industry, CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 2010, at 6, 6. An important caveat to these figures is that they 
often come from studies funded by the media industry itself and thus must be viewed critically to 
assess their reliability. See Julian Sanchez, How Copyright Industries Con Congress, CATO INST. 
(Jan. 3, 2012, 3:07 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/how-copyright-industries-con-congress/. 
 52. Goel et al., supra note 51, at 6. 
 53. Heather N. Kjos, Note, The Statutory Damages Regime of Copyright Law: The Non-
Commercial User and Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 1 CYBARIS 174, 185 (2010). 
 54. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001). In 
Napster, end users of the Napster program directly infringed on the plaintiffs’ copyrights by 
unlawfully reproducing copies of sound recordings located on other users’ computers. Id. at 
1013–14. The Ninth Circuit found that Napster, by providing the means for direct infringement, 
“knowingly encourage[d] and assist[ed] the infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrights” and thus likely 
was contributorily liable. Id. at 1020, 1022. The court further concluded that Napster likely was 
vicariously liable because of its “failure to police the system’s ‘premises,’ combined with a 
showing that Napster financially benefit[ted] from the continuing availability of infringing files 
on its system.” Id. at 1024. In rejecting Napster’s contention that its service constituted fair use, 
the court made observations about the dangers of P2P infringement that accord with the First 
Circuit’s findings in Tenenbaum. It concluded that Napster had a “deleterious effect” on the 
current and potential legitimate digital download market, which the record companies had the 
right to explore. Id. at 1017. 
 55. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Whereas in 
Napster, the P2P application used a centralized list referring users to copyrighted works on 
others’ computers, Grokster attempted to avoid liability by maintaining a decentralized system 
that simply gave users access to works stored on other users’ computers. Id. at 919–20. The Court 
rejected this method of dodging liability, reasoning that since Grokster encouraged users to 
employ its service for infringing purposes, it could be liable under the “inducement rule.” Id. at 
941. The “inducement rule” adopted by the Court finds secondary liability where one “distributes 
a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression 
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.” Id. at 936–37. 
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rights. The companies’ work went unrewarded, however, since new 
applications constantly appear when the old are shut down.56 
Beyond litigation against software companies, the recording industry 
attempted to educate the American public about the seriousness of 
infringement via P2P applications, cautioning that the practice was both illegal 
and subject to enormous penalties.57 Still, their losses increased and their 
warnings went unheeded.58 To continue their fight to uphold their rights and 
economic viability, the companies chose a treacherous course: suits directly 
against individual infringers.59 
II.  LOOKING OUT FOR THE SMALL GUYS: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN 
TENENBAUM AND THOMAS-RASSET 
The stage was thus set for Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset. The trial courts 
in both cases struck down huge jury awards of statutory damages on 
substantive due process grounds.60 A brief analysis of the history and 
reasoning behind the trial courts’ opinions will prepare the discussion of the 
First Circuit’s Tenenbaum opinion. 
A. Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum 
Joel Tenenbaum infringed thousands of copyrights through P2P 
applications like Napster and Kazaa.61 His infringement was like most others 
in the P2P context—he illegally downloaded copyrighted sound recordings by 
accessing other users’ digital copies of the works.62 He then placed these 
recordings in his “shared” folder in the application, which facilitated others’ 
copying of those works.63 
 
 56. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 2011); see also 
David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intellectual Property 
Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1700–01 (2005) 
(noting that users migrated to new platforms for P2P file-sharing after Napster and Grokster); 
Hiawatha Bray, Little-Used Corner of Net Becomes Piracy Battlefield, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 9, 
2006, at D1 (discussing Usenet sites as growing alternatives to traditional P2P applications). 
 57. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 492; see also Kjos, supra note 53, at 185 (noting that the record 
companies launched an advertising campaign to battle P2P file-sharing). 
 58. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 492. 
 59. John Eric Seay, Note, “Hang ‘Em High”: Will the Recording Industry  Association of 
America’s New Plan to Posse Up with Internet Service Providers in the Fight Against Online 
Music Piracy Finally Tame the Wild Internet?, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 269, 270 (2009). 
 60. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011 (D. Minn. 2011), 
vacated, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 
85, 116 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 
2011). 
 61. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 90. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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Tenenbaum failed to stop this infringment even when warned by Sony and 
other companies that suit would follow without cessation.64 After this stern 
warning and Tenenbaum’s persistent pattern of infringement, those companies 
filed suit.65 Though Tenenbaum had literally thousands of copyrighted works 
stored on his computer and in his shared folder, the companies alleged 
copyright infringement for only thirty recordings.66 At trial, a jury found that 
Tenenbaum was liable for willful infringement under the Copyright Act.67 The 
jury then proceeded to award statutory damages to the plaintiffs of $675,000, 
or $22,500 per recording.68 
Appalled by the great size of the award, Judge Gertner filed a lengthy 
opinion that struck down the award as unconstitutionally excessive.69 She did 
so without first resorting to the common-law mechanism of remittitur,70 which 
allows the judge to reduce a jury award and then offer that reduced amount to 
the plaintiff, who may either accept it or reject it and be given a new trial.71 
Contrary to the established judicial practice of constitutional avoidance,72 she 
reasoned that the constitutional due process question had to be addressed prior 
to remittitur, since remittitur would be ineffective in this case.73 
After summarily rejecting the necessity of remittitur, Judge Gertner turned 
to the issue of substantive due process. She first had to determine the standard 
to be applied when reviewing a jury award of statutory damages.74 The 
possibilities she considered included the standards enunciated in St. Louis, Iron 
Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Williams and BMW of North America, 
Inc. v. Gore.75 Here again, Judge Gertner ruled against the clear mandate of the 
law.76 Williams spoke directly to the issue of substantive due-process review of 
 
 64. Id. at 90–91. 
 65. Id. at 91. 
 66. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d. at 90–91. 
 67. Id. at 91. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 116. 
 70. Id. at 93–94. 
 71. See David Fink, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, the Remittitur Doctrine, and the 
Implications for Tort Reform, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 227, 227 (1999); 58 AM. JUR. 2d New Trial § 
451 (2002). 
 72. See generally Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–381 (2005) (defining the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance); see also 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8363 (2006) (stating that avoiding constitutional 
questions is a well-established judicial practice). 
 73. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 93–94. Judge Gertner notes in the opinion’s introduction 
that “[t]he plaintiffs in this case . . . made it abundantly clear that they were, to put it mildly, 
going for broke,” and thus likely would not accept a remitted award. Id. at 88. 
 74. Id. at 95. 
 75. Id. at 95–100. 
 76. See infra Part III.C. 
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statutory damage awards,77 while Gore was concerned with similar review in 
the punitive damages context.78 Nevertheless, Judge Gertner found that the 
Gore standard was appropriate for this case, since the due process concerns it 
expressed were important in both statutory and punitive damages contexts.79 
She further found that statutory damages should bear some reasonable relation 
to actual damages.80 
Applying the three Gore “guideposts” to the facts of the case, Gertner 
concluded that the jury award against Tenenbaum was “grossly excessive” and 
unconstitutional.81 She then lowered the award to $67,500, or $2,250 per 
song.82 This per-song amount was three times the statutory minimum, a 
calculation Judge Gertner based on the ancient practice of treble damages in 
punitive damage awards.83 
B. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset 
Jammie Thomas-Rasset also used Kazaa to illegally download music to her 
computer and then share those files with others.84 She was sued by record 
companies for the infringement of twenty-four songs.85 In the first case, a jury 
found willful infringement.86 That jury, and another after, returned large 
statutory damages awards against her.87 Judge Davis remitted the second 
 
 77. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 63–65 (1919). 
 78. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562–63 (1996). 
 79. See Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 102–03. 
 80. Id. at 103. 
 81. Id. at 121. Judge Gertner assessed the three guideposts separately. See id. at 103–16 
(finding that Tenenbaum, though his conduct could be considered reprehensible, was still within 
the class of relatively harmless file-sharing offenders, that Congress likely did not anticipate this 
kind of infringement when increasing statutory penalties through the DMCA, and that “[w]hile 
file-sharing may be very economically damaging to the plaintiffs in the aggregate, Tenenbaum’s 
individual contribution to this total harm was likely minimal”). 
 82. Id. at 89. 
 83. See Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d. at 117 (“Of course, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) does not, by its 
own terms, limit the statutory damages available in cases such as Tenenbaum’s to three times the 
statutory minimum. However, capping the statutory damages range at $2,250 in this case serves 
the objectives of compensating the plaintiffs and deterring illegal file-sharing while at the same 
time ensuring that the total award is not grossly excessive.”). But see Sheffner, supra note 27, at 
3–4 (discussing Judge Gertner’s illogical application of treble damages). 
 84. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1002 (D. Minn. 2011), 
vacated, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (awarding a total damages award of $222,000 in the first case and $1,920,000 in the 
second case). Judge Davis did not remit after the first award because he found an error in jury 
instructions regarding the definition of “distribution” that warranted a new trial. See Capitol 
Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226–27 (D. Minn. 2008). 
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award, and the plaintiffs rejected the remittitur.88 At the third trial, which was 
limited to damages, the jury found statutory damages of $1,500,000, or 
$62,500 per song.89 
When ruling on Thomas-Rasset’s subsequent motion to alter or amend the 
judgment, unlike Judge Gertner, Judge Davis rejected the Gore guideposts.90 
He instead concluded that the Williams standard was clearly the most 
appropriate to copyright statutory damage awards.91 Though he found the 
Williams standard applicable, he interestingly cited a punitive damages case to 
support his eventual lowering of the jury award.92 
Judge Davis then applied the Williams standard to the case. He concluded 
that the award was unconstitutionally excessive even under that deferential 
standard.93 He acknowledged some of the primary reasons advanced by both 
the record companies and the United States in support of the statutory award. 
First, he recognized that anonymous online infringers need to be deterred.94 He 
also recognized that P2P file-sharing creates huge potential damages for record 
labels, not merely the loss of one consumer’s purchase.95 He further observed 
that record companies can hardly protect the value of their copyrights in the 
face of free music sharing.96 
Though Judge Davis chose the appropriate standard for reviewing the jury 
award,97 he still made a number of questionable contentions. For example, he 
 
 88. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1002–03. 
 89. Id. at 1003. 
 90. Id. at 1005. Judge Davis found that statutory damages, while punitive, are also 
compensatory. See id. He further noted that the notice concerns that underlay the Gore punitive-
damages jurisprudence are simply inapplicable to statutory awards where the amount of liability 
is spelled out in the statute. Id. Finally, he pointed out that the Gore guideposts themselves 
“cannot be logically applied” to statutory awards. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1006. 
 92. Id. at 1011 (citing Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 285 F.3d 1146, 
1152 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 93. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. 
 94. Id. at 1010 (“Due to the nature of peer-to-peer networks, such as Kazaa, there are 
numberless opportunities for Thomas-Rasset—and other individuals—to commit infringement of 
copyrighted sound recordings. It is easy, costless, and quick to infringe online. There are millions 
of users seeking to download and distribute sound recordings. There are countless sound 
recordings and other copyrighted material to be infringed. Kazaa was capable of allowing the 
sharing of hundreds of millions of files at a time. At the time that MediaSentry interacted with 
Thomas-Rasset on Kazaa, there were more than 2 million users online sharing more than 800 
million files. Thomas-Rasset, herself, compiled almost 2,000 songs in her Kazaa shared folder. 
Because of the design of peer-to-peer networks, such as Kazaa, copyright holders face formidable 
challenges in identifying and stopping infringers.”). 
 95. Id. at 1008 (“[O]nline piracy has cost the recording industry billions of dollars and has 
threatened its viability.”). 
 96. See id. at 1008–1009. 
 97. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] PEER-TO-PEER FILE-SHARING, DUE PROCESS, AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE 817 
cited only a single district court opinion to support the “necessary” relationship 
between statutory and compensatory damages.98 This assertion is quite 
unconvincing in light of the purposes of statutory damages, which, as 
discussed above, clearly obviate the need for a relationship between statutory 
and actual damages.99 Judge Davis also followed Judge Gertner’s mistake of 
applying the concept of treble damages to the jury award.100 Citing his 
rationale from a January 2010 order, which justified a cap on awards at three 
times the statutory minimum,101 Davis lowered the $1,500,000 statutory 
damages award to $54,000, or $2,250 per song.102 
III.  LOOKING OUT FOR THE BIG GUYS: THE FIRST CIRCUIT AND TENENBAUM 
Having discussed the reasoning of the trial court in Tenenbaum, I will now 
turn to the First Circuit’s disposition of the appeal of that case. After reporting 
its findings and responses to Tenenbaum’s claims on appeal, I discuss how 
legislative history, caselaw, and modern circumstances support its implied 
views on the substantive due process issues decided by Judge Gertner. Finally, 
I address a number of potential criticisms of its reasoning and the broader 
implications of its opinion. These critiques acknowledge the state of the law as 
 
 98. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (“However, because statutory damages have, in 
part, a compensatory purpose, ‘assessed statutory damages should bear some relation to the actual 
damages suffered.’” (quoting Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 983, 987 (E.D. 
Pa.1986))). This illogical move is even more surprising in light of Judge Davis’s repeated 
concession that statutory damages by nature require no relation to actual damages. Thomas-
Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1006 (“Congress expressly rejected the idea that a statutory damages 
award should bear some specific ratio to the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff . . . .”); see also 
id. at 1007 (noting that neither the Constitution nor the Court requires a “strict proportionality” 
between harm suffered and statutory award). Perhaps Judge Davis was attempting to distinguish 
“strict” from “some” relation. The Court has not endorsed such a nuanced approach. The Eighth 
Circuit recognized Judge Davis’s fallacious reasoning in its opinion: 
The district court similarly concluded that “statutory damages must still bear some 
relation to actual damages.” The Supreme Court in Williams, however, disagreed that the 
constitutional inquiry calls for a comparison of an award of statutory damages to actual 
damages caused by the violation. 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 909 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 99. See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text; see also Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg 
Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 459 (D. Md. 2004) (stating that there has never been a 
requirement that statutory damages and actual damages be strictly related because statutory 
damages are an alternative to actual damages). 
 100. See Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. 
 101. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1056–57 (D. Minn. 
2010). 
 102. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. Judge Davis failed to see that the trebling 
method increases, not decreases, awards. The court also failed to justify why the $750 minimum 
award is the appropriate starting place from which to treble damages. See Sheffner, supra note 27, 
at 3–4 (pointing out the same illogical approach applied by Judge Gertner in Tenenbaum). 
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it stands today. Indeed, I believe it is rare that a statute is so out of touch with 
the interests of justice that a judicial foray is required to correct the 
discrepancy.103 Such is not the case here.104 Rather, on balance, modern 
cultural norms call for a congressional revision of the copyright regime in light 
of the new and expanding internet culture.105 
A. What It Did 
After hearing the appeal in Tenenbaum, the First Circuit rejected Judge 
Gertner’s opinion. First, the court implicitly overturned the application of the 
Gore guideposts for substantive due process analysis in statutory damages.106 
The First Circuit implicitly found the Gore guideposts inapplicable because 
actual damages, an important part of the Gore analysis, are difficult or 
impossible to calculate in the P2P context.107 Moreover, the fundamental 
 
 103. It is a common refrain in constitutional law that courts must only apply the law as given 
to them by Congress, not rewrite it to conform to their notions of what an appropriate result 
should be. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 500 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the absence of a congressional solution, courts cannot avoid 
difficult problems by refusing to apply the law. We must ‘take the Copyright Act . . . as we find 
it’ . . . .” (quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401–02 
(1968))); Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc., 651 F.3d 857, 863 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (“‘Where the plain meaning of a statute is clear, we are not free to replace it with an 
unenacted legislative intent.’” (quoting Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. United Van 
Lines, LLC, 556 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); DGR 
Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 189, 194 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (“If Congress intended 
something different from what it stated, Congress alone must enact an appropriate amendment, as 
this Court can only apply the laws as written.” (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 254 (1992))). 
 104. The Copyright Act has often been found to be clear. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989) (noting that Congress’s primary goal in crafting the 
1976 Act was to “enhanc[e] predictability and certainty”); Robert Meitus, Note, Interpreting the 
Copyright Act’s Section 201(c) Revision Privilege with Respect to Electronic Media, 52 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 749, 753–54 (2000) (concluding that the 1909 Act “lacked clarity and coherence,” in 
contrast to the 1976 Act, which was a product of “comprehensive hearings and reports” over a 
twenty-year span). But see Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the 
Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45, 88 n.185 (2007) (arguing that 
the 1976 Act lacks clarity in a variety of areas). This clarity stands in marked contrast to other 
federal statutes that are notorious for being convoluted. See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 
526, 534 (2004) (finding the Bankruptcy Code “awkward, and even ungrammatical”). 
 105. See infra notes 181–85 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 508–09 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(discussing both the Williams and Gore standards and noting the significant differences between 
the punitive damages and statutory damages contexts). The court’s language, ostensibly leaving 
this constitutional question undecided, undoubtedly points to the Williams standard. See id. at 
509, 512 (noting that Gore addresses a “related but distinct” issue and explicitly noting the United 
States’s position that “an inferior federal court may not displace [Williams’s] on point holding”). 
 107. See id. at 502. 
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concern with fair notice motivating the Gore analysis is simply nonexistent in 
the statutory damages context.108 
The court also dedicated significant discussion to rejecting Tenenbaum’s 
contention that his status as a “consumer-copier” infringer necessitated a lower 
award because he did not make commercial gain from his infringement like a 
“publisher-copier” would.109 Though he argued that such staggering awards 
did not comport with congressional intent, the court dismissed Tenenbaum’s 
conclusion as contrary to the plain language and clear meaning of the 
Copyright Act.110 
To actually dispose of the appeal, however, the court did not definitively 
reach the constitutional due process issues.111 Instead, it vacated Judge 
Gertner’s application of substantive due process to reduce a jury award of 
statutory damages based on her refusal to first proceed with common law 
remittitur.112 Invoking the fundamental judicial principle of constitutional 
avoidance, the court concluded that Gertner improperly decided the 
constitutional question despite available non-constitutional grounds for 
decision.113 
Although it did not formally reach the constitutional issues raised by the 
parties and addressed by Judge Gertner, the First Circuit’s opinion hinted at its 
view on the subject. First, it acknowledged the serious threat to the recording 
industry’s viability posed by P2P applications, both currently and in their 
potential growth.114 Beyond recognition of the importance of copyright 
enforcement in the P2P context, the court only thinly veiled its preference for 
the Williams standard in substantive due process review of statutory damages 
awards. The court pointed out that Gore did not overrule Williams, implying 
that the standards do not cover the same issues or types of claims.115 Further, 
the First Circuit found that the Supreme Court has never suggested that Gore 
should apply to statutory damages, and moreover that the notice issues present 
in Gore are simply inapplicable to statutory damage awards.116 This preference 
 
 108. Id. at 513 (“The concerns regarding fair notice to the parties of the range of possible 
punitive damage awards present in Gore are simply not present in a statutory damages case where 
the statute itself provides notice of the scope of the potential award.”). 
 109. See id. at 497–501. 
 110. See id. at 501 (disparaging Tenenbaum’s attempt to convince the court to “ignore the 
plain language of the [Copyright Act] and Congressional intent”). 
 111. See Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 511. 
 112. Id. at 515. 
 113. See id. at 511–13. 
 114. Id. at 492. 
 115. See id. at 513. 
 116. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 513. The court, in comparing Williams and statutory damages to 
Gore and punitive damages, termed Gore’s focus on punitives a “related but distinct issue.” Id. at 
512. This result accords with the Sixth Circuit’s findings in Zomba, in which the court found that 
an award of statutory damages under the Copyright Act was governed by Williams, in opposition 
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seems to be a logical outgrowth from the court’s earlier emphasis on plain 
meaning117: the Williams standard applies on its face to statutory damages, 
whereas Gore does not. 
B. What It Got Right 
From the analysis thus far, we have seen that the First Circuit showed 
implied support of the statutory damages award upon application of 
substantive due process review. Examining the court’s reasoning in greater 
detail, I argue that current copyright statutes demand this result. While the 
penalty was high and likely very damaging to Tenenbaum, such sympathy 
cannot overcome the judiciary’s limited role in the administration of the law.118 
The First Circuit found that congressional intent clearly supports these 
statutory awards, contrary to arguments that Congress has either neglected to 
attend to the issue or is unaware of the huge awards in the P2P context.119 
Quite the opposite is true: Congress was well aware of the dangers posed by 
 
to dicta from other circuits indicating otherwise. See Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, 
Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 588 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Until the Supreme Court applies Campbell to an award 
of statutory damages, we conclude that Williams controls, not Campbell, and accordingly reject 
Panorama’s due-process argument.”). There, a music publisher sued a karaoke CD manufacturer 
for unlawfully copying and selling copies of its copyrighted works. Id. at 579–80. Even at a 44:1 
ratio of statutory damages to lost licensing fees, the court found no constitutional violation under 
the highly deferential Williams standard. Id. at 588. 
 117. See Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 500. 
 118. See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal 
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42 (2001) (“The federal judiciary, like the federal government as 
a whole, ‘is one of delegated and limited powers.’ . . . Moreover, because these limitations are 
intrinsic and structural, they cannot be overcome merely by demonstrating that the parties have 
consented to a court’s exercise of power, or that this exercise would be of manifest utility to 
society or to the legal system.” (footnotes omitted)); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional 
Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 27 (1998) (“The Framers 
plainly intended that the federal judiciary’s policy-making role would be limited to the power of 
judicial review, a power that would be exercised only in cases or controversies of 
‘a Judiciary nature’; the Framers were aware of various alternate arrangements in the states but 
expressly chose to reject such arrangements in favor of a more limited judicial role.”). Judge 
Gertner’s flouting of the plain language of the Copyright Act amounts to a judicial enforcement 
not of law but of political opinion. This broad discretion to announce policy is best left to the 
legislature. See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1356 (11th Cir. 2000) (“As policymakers, it is 
the duty of the Congress and of the executive branch to exercise political will. Although courts 
should not be unquestioning, we should respect the other branches’ policymaking powers. The 
judicial power is a limited power. It is the duty of the judicial branch not to exercise political will, 
but only to render judicial judgment under the law.”). 
 119. See Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 500 (finding that Congress did anticipate internet 
infringement like P2P and set the provisions of the Copyright Act accordingly). 
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the growth of the internet.120 While P2P was not a mainstream medium of 
infringement at the time the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) was 
enacted,121 it shows remarkable congressional foresight for that very reason. 
The expansion of statutory penalties reflects a legislative judgment that 
internet-based infringement would similarly expand, requiring harsher 
controls.122 
Expanding on this argument of deference to legislative intent, one can see 
problems with Judge Davis’s January 2010 order in Thomas-Rasset in which 
he justifies his method of lowering damages. In that order, he cites many 
statutes with treble damages provisions.123 However, the Copyright Act has 
none.124 If Congress had wanted such a provision in the Copyright Act, it 
would have included one.125 This is all the more compelling when one 
recognizes the existence of such provisions in other statutes.126 If Congress had 
created such provisions in other contexts and did not do so in the Copyright 
Act, a modicum of respect for Congress’s legislative competence requires us to 
accept that Congress consciously chose not to do so.127 
Another reason related to legislative intent for upholding statutory awards 
in P2P infringement cases is the First Circuit’s conclusion that non-commercial 
classification is not relevant to either the jury or a reviewing judge.128 The First 
 
 120. See Pamela Samuelson & Ben Sheffner, Debate, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory 
Damage Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53, 70 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/CopyrightDamages.pdf; Kirby, supra note 26, at 40. 
 121. See Christian E. Mammen, File Sharing is Dead! Long Live File Sharing! Recent 
Developments in the Law of Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement, 33 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 443, 445–49 (2011) (discussing the enactment of the DMCA in 1998 and that 
the first cases to involve individual infringement in the form of peer-to-peer file-sharing did not 
arise until several years later). 
 122. See Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458 (D. Md. 2004) 
(The DMCA “substantially increase[d] statutory damages for non-willful and willful infringement 
in order to provide ‘more stringent deterrents’ to copyright violations including those involving 
computer users and Internet activity.”). 
 123. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1057 (D. Minn. 
2010). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
14.04(E)(1)(a) (2011) [hereinafter NIMMER]. 
 126. See Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. 
 127. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
412 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the 
facilities and competence for that task—as we do not.”); see also Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to 
be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of 
Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 865 (2009) (concluding that “[w]hen a branch other than 
Congress . . . legislates, that branch violates formalist separation of powers”). 
 128. See Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 120, at 71; see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-339, at 5 
(1997) (criminalizing “computer theft of copyrighted works, whether or not the defendant derives 
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Circuit discussed the frivolity of this argument at length, showing how 
Tenenbaum’s copying was hardly for personal use: 
  Tenenbaum argues to us that Congress never intended for the Copyright 
Act to impose liability or statutory damages against what he calls “consumer 
copiers.” . . . Tenenbaum is not a “consumer-copier,” a term he never clearly 
defines. He is not a consumer whose infringement was merely that he failed to 
pay for copies of music recordings which he downloaded for his own personal 
use. Rather, he widely and repeatedly copied works belonging to Sony and 
then illegally distributed those works to others, who also did not pay Sony. 
Further, he received, in turn, other copyrighted works for which he did not pay. 
Nor can Tenenbaum assert that his was merely a “non-commercial” use and 
distribution of copyrighted works as those terms are used elsewhere in the Act. 
His use and distribution was for private gain and involved repeated and 
exploitative copying.129 
One distinction that should be addressed here is the significant difference 
between “shared folder” personal use and truly personal use, where the 
infringer does not allow the copy to remain available for others to share.130 The 
former is clearly the kind at issue in Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset. It is 
arguably not personal and creates the widespread, viral harm that the First 
Circuit recognized as rightfully deterred.131 It is in fact a pseudo-commercial 
 
a direct financial benefit from the act(s) of misappropriation, thereby preventing such willful 
conduct from destroying businesses”). But see Kjos, supra note 53, at 200. The Court in 
Woolworth famously noted that “[e]ven for uninjurious and unprofitable invasions of copyright 
the court may . . . impose a liability within statutory limits to sanction and vindicate the statutory 
policy.” F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952). In the two 
primary cases, it can be argued that Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset, though they did not 
personally profit beyond the free recordings they obtained, were a part of the “profitable” 
enterprise of stealing music via P2P applications. The lack of cost should be considered identical 
to a profit; assuming as much, the brotherhood of dishonesty that drives illegal P2P downloading 
is an immensely profitable venture. 
 129. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 497 (1st Cir. 2011) (footnote 
omitted). 
 130. Criminal law may lend a helpful hand here. In criminal prosecutions, a distinction is 
made between those who possess illegal drugs and those who possess with intent to distribute. 
See United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1978) (concluding that simple 
possession does not become possession with intent to distribute by the mere possession of a small 
amount of drugs, but that other circumstantial evidence can show intent despite a small quantity). 
No great leap is needed to analogize here: those who merely download for their own personal use, 
without distributing to others, are clearly less culpable and deserve less punishment than those 
who download huge numbers of works and distribute them freely. The concept is indeed clearer 
in the P2P infringement context because the primary indicator of intent to distribute would be 
whether the user has copyrighted works in his shared folder. The existence of a file in a shared 
folder is likely strong circumstantial evidence of intent to distribute that file to others. 
 131. See Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 497 (finding that Tenenbaum “widely and repeatedly” 
copied works and “then illegally distributed those works to others”). 
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use, since although the user himself may see no direct profit, making works 
available to the general public affects the commercial market for such works. 
Truly personal use, in contrast, does not affect the market as severely because 
only one hypothetical sale is lost. Nevertheless, this concern is not remediable 
under the current copyright scheme, which makes no such division.132 
One method of introducing such a distinction would be to imply the 
“making available” right133 into the distribution right.134 Such a right would 
address the important difference between a “shared folder” infringer and 
private infringer. By distinguishing between those who facilitate widespread 
infringement through extensive “shared” folders and those who download 
copies for personal use without making them available for others’ downloads, 
the doctrine could address an important aspect of contemporary P2P 
infringement.135 The circuits are divided on the viability of the “making 
 
 132. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 133. See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 
1997) (finding violation of the distribution right where a person or entity “has completed all the 
steps necessary for distribution to the public” without a showing of any actual dissemination of 
the copyrighted work). But see Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162–63 
(9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the plaintiff was not likely to succeed in proving that the defendant 
violated its distribution rights where defendant did not actually distribute the images); London-
Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168 (D. Mass. 2008) (“Merely because the 
defendant has ‘completed all the steps necessary for distribution’ does not necessarily mean that a 
distribution has actually occurred.”). 
Traditional interpretive canons may justify the “making available” right as a standalone right, 
unconnected to the distribution right. Prof. Caminker argues, in the federal supremacy context, 
against the application of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon. See Evan H. Caminker, 
State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement 
Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1032–33 (1995). He notes that there is an opposite 
maxim that calls for implied terms even where they are not enumerated. Id. at 1033. Though the 
Copyright Act has traditionally been interpreted as containing specific, enumerated rights (thus 
not admitting implied rights), here one could apply Caminker’s argument that there may be a 
“plausible explanation for why a particular text would sensibly refer expressly to certain 
examples of a more general proposition.” See id. at 1034. This is because the broader principles 
of the Copyright Act may support such implication. One such principle is the notion that the 
Copyright Act in its modern form is meant to adapt to changing social and technological 
circumstances in order to protect copyright holders no matter the technological loopholes 
discovered. Using the maxim of implication, then, one could imply from this broad purpose that 
the “making available” right is a necessarily implied adaptation to the special dangers posed by 
the P2P file-sharing model. While Caminker’s argument is not particularly persuasive on its own 
terms, the application of such an interpretational maxim at least points out the different ways in 
which the Copyright Act could be made to adapt to modern circumstances. 
 134. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006). 
 135. See generally Brent C. Johnson, Note, The Making Available Argument: Is Actual 
Distribution Required to Find Infringement Upon the Copyright Holder’s Distribution Right?, 85 
N.D. L. REV. 371, 389 (2009) (discussing how the plaintiff in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell 
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available” right,136 however, so neither the First nor the Eighth Circuit is bound 
to apply such a nuanced approach in the face of the Copyright Act’s clear 
enumeration of rights.137 As with other criticisms reviewed later, although this 
matter is not for the courts to remedy, it suggests that Congress may need to 
better balance rights and access in their legislation, which now strongly favors 
powerful media interests.138 
In addition to congressional intent, a number of modern circumstances 
militate in favor of upholding statutory awards in P2P infringement cases. 
First, the recording industry is suffering and will continue to suffer huge 
damages from the growth of mainstream P2P file-sharing.139 Judge Gertner 
argued that Congress could not have intended such large statutory awards in 
P2P cases, since P2P file-sharing was not a major problem in 1999.140 
However, the development and popularization of this method of infringement 
supports high statutory penalties. Such awards will provide the necessary, 
harsh deterrence required to stamp out the wildfire of internet-based copyright 
infringement.141 The flame is spreading far beyond copyrighted sound 
recordings. Other readily available online media, such as movies and television 
programs, are beginning to feel the pressure already experienced by the 
recording industry.142 
 
obtained summary judgment under the making-available doctrine by showing that the defendant 
kept more than 2000 copyrighted sound recordings in his shared folder); Darren Gelber, 
Cybercrimes: File-Sharing Programs Violating Copyright and Child Pornography Distribution 
Laws, N.J. LAW., Dec. 2008, at 66, 66 (describing how the shared-folder system operates). 
 136. See supra note 133. 
 137. Thomas-Rasset’s case in particular faced an uphill battle in advocating for the “making 
available” right. Judge Davis rejected it at length when it was presented to him during the first 
trial in that case. See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1223–24 (D. Minn. 
2008). Judge Davis also found that Eighth Circuit precedent bound him to this conclusion, albeit 
somewhat indirectly. See id. (concluding that the actual-dissemination requirement enunciated in 
National Car Rental applies to P2P infringement). 
 138. See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 492 (1st Cir. 2011); BMG 
Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2005); Dougherty, supra note 33, at 4 (arguing 
that the recording industry “has been really slammed” by “widespread public sharing” via P2P 
applications). 
 140. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d. 85, 104 (D. Mass. 2010), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 141. See Seay, supra note 59, at 271. 
 142. See, e.g., Sony Pictures Home Entm’t Inc. v. Lott, 471 F. Supp. 2d 716 (N.D. Tex. 
2007); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Ariz. 2006); 
Disney Enters., Inc. v. Delane, 446 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D. Md. 2006); Disney Enters., Inc. v. 
Farmer, 427 F. Supp. 2d 807 (E.D. Tenn. 2006); see also Will Moseley, Note, A New (Old) 
Solution for Online Copyright Enforcement After Thomas and Tenenbaum, 25 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 311, 337–38 (2010) (explaining that other industries are facing the same monumental dangers 
from P2P infringement already faced by the recording industry). 
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From this conclusion a further impetus for a strong statutory damages 
regime emerges. Computer technology is advancing so rapidly that new fora 
for file-sharing will always spring up as the old are caught and shut down.143 
The First Circuit recognized as much in its opinion.144 The exponential growth 
of technology and internet-based vehicles for infringement requires an 
adaptable system of enforcement.145 Thus, statutory penalties, which eliminate 
the burden of proving actual damages, are thoroughly warranted as a measure 
to expedite cases. By allowing quick responses to new technologies and 
innovations in infringement, this regime ensures that judgments are not 
irrelevant by the time they are entered. 
One further method for improving the turnaround rate in copyright 
litigation is the implementation of a stronger administrative presence.146 
Currently, the Copyright Office does not wield the kinds of adjudicative 
powers that are common among administrative agencies.147 The scope and 
power of administrative agencies is a hotly disputed subject and beyond the 
scope of this Comment.148 However, it is worth noting that the same principles 
 
 143. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 751 (2003) (concluding that 
“computer users will simply find new ways to free-ride” as P2P applications come and go). One 
troubling development in online media consumption is the growing popularity of “streaming” 
video and audio works. See infra notes 196–210 and accompanying text. Streaming technology is 
a new method by which users may circumvent copyright protections. Doubtless other methods 
will continue to be innovated to keep pace with increased protections. One wonders if the 
Copyright Act is thereby promoting innovation in infringement even when it attempts to deter. 
 144. See Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d at 492 (“Although these litigation efforts succeeded at shutting 
down particular networks, individual infringers continued to engage in illegal conduct by finding 
new peer-to-peer networks through which to download copyrighted songs.”). 
 145. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 37–38 (D.D.C.) (noting 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the DMCA was to provide for copyright protection in light of the 
technological developments of the digital age), rev’d sub nom. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 
Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 146. See generally Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System 
for Resolving Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005) 
(advocating for the introduction of administrative judges into the Copyright Office who can 
resolve certain classes of peer-to-peer copyright infringement cases); Jason Mazzone, 
Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (2009) (promoting a similar 
administrative solution for fair use disputes). 
 147. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses 
and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 420 n.376 (2010) (“For a 
regulatory system of such complexity and economic scope, copyright is unusual in that it has 
remained largely unaffected by the post-New Deal expansion in the power of administrative 
agencies.”). 
 148. Compare Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56–57 (1932) (noting the “utility and 
convenience” of administrative agencies within their proper limitations), with Martin H. Redish, 
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 
197, 216–17 (finding few practical limits on the power of administrative agency adjudications). 
Cf. James O. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
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that motivated the development of strong administrative agencies, namely, 
necessity and complexity,149 are now more than ever straining the copyright 
regime’s ability to cope with an increasingly fast-paced American society. 
Necessity grows from the need to give parties rules to live by ex ante. 
Tenenbaum highlights the problem of technology becoming obsolete before 
traditional litigation concludes.150 This result cannot square with the 
exponential growth of the internet and the accompanying increase in disputes 
over copyrightable content in it.151 
Furthermore, the internet is constantly redefined by technological 
innovation.152 Complex technologies require informed responses.153 Copyright 
law could profit greatly from the specialized experience of an administrative 
agency.154 The other two major areas of intellectual property law, patent and 
 
1041, 1048 (1975) (“The anomalous position of administrative agencies in a system of 
government so deeply committed to the theory of the separation of powers has naturally been the 
subject of intense consideration.”). 
 149. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986) 
(concluding that Congress sought to provide the public with an “inexpensive and expeditious 
alternative forum” in creating the Commodity Futures Trading Commission); Mark Tushnet, 
Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal 
Theory, 60 DUKE L.J. 1565, 1568–76 (2011) (describing progressive efforts in the 1930s to 
promote administrative agencies that could adapt to the “rapidity of social and economic change” 
with specialized expertise). 
 150. Kazaa, one of the P2P programs at issue in Tenenbaum, has long been out of favor with 
consumers in light of newer, faster, and more secure programs. See Ross Drath, Comment, 
Hotfile, Megaupload, and the Future of Copyright on the Internet: What Can Cyberlockers Tell 
Us About DMCA Reform?, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 206 (2012). 
 151. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Talya Yaylaian, Comment, Warning: Statutes May Be Interpreted in an 
Unforeseeably Expansive Manner: United States v. Councilman, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 333 
n.328 (2007) (“Because of rapid technological innovation and its dynamic influence on human 
interaction, however, the [internet] poses a number of difficulties to the imposition of traditional 
legal protocols.” (quoting Thomas Flynn & Mark Chase, Debating Community or Code: Case 
Studies in Alternative Internet Regulation, in REALLAW@VIRTUAL SPACE: COMMUNICATION 
REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE 345, 347 (Susan J. Drucker & Gary Gumpert eds., 2d ed. 2005)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 153. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C.) (finding that 
Congress sought to address “rapid technological innovations on the Internet” through the 
DMCA), rev’d sub nom. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 
F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Jessica Litman has criticized the current legislative process for 
copyright reform for its inability to adapt to technological change. See Jessica Litman, Copyright 
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 277 (1989). 
 154. See Armstrong, supra note 147, at 420 n.376 (noting that the “inclusion of exceedingly 
detailed and complicated technical provisions” in the Copyright Act counsels that its cases “might 
be better handled by administrative regulation”); Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on 
Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551, 557–58 (suggesting reasons a model would be 
beneficial and providing a framework for such a model). 
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trademark, have reaped these benefits for many years.155 While critics raise 
strong concerns regarding the legitimacy and fairness of dispute resolution 
through administrative agencies versus traditional Article III courts,156 the 
fundamental essence of internet culture—speed and convenience—demands a 
more expeditious response.157 
Current statutory awards also comport with deeper jurisprudential 
principles. Damage to the recording industry is also damage to the public 
because it discourages creation,158 which, as discussed above, is a founding 
principle of copyright protection in the United States.159 Though one might 
doubt the creativity applied by record companies, it takes only momentary 
reflection to recognize the substantial creativity and skill required to produce a 
high-quality, enjoyable sound recording.160 Finally, there is an even more 
fundamental principle of American law, beyond copyright itself, that supports 
these awards: no matter who is losing money (even a lone infringer) or whose 
rights are being infringed (even large, wealthy record companies), citizens 
should be held to the rule of law for societal stability and protection of 
 
 155. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) reviews patent applications, trademark 
registrations, and disputes in each area. See Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1528 
(4th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he Patent and Trademark Office is the administrative agency initially 
charged with determining the registerability of a mark or figure . . . .”); Canady v. Erbe 
Elektromedizin GmbH, 271 F. Supp. 2d 64, 79 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[T]he PTO is a technically 
specialized administrative agency well-equipped to examine and determine patentability . . . .”). 
 156. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 860–62 (1986) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (cautioning that “ important functions of Article III” in protecting 
separation of powers and an independent judiciary ”are too central to our constitutional scheme to 
risk their incremental erosion” through increased administrative agency adjudicative powers). But 
see Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) (recognizing the 
separation of powers concerns implicated in administrative agency adjudications but upholding 
their validity). 
 157. See infra notes 181–85 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1010 (D. Minn. 2011) 
(“The public has a strong interest in rewarding and protecting copyright owners in order to 
encourage the creation of valuable works to be shared with the public.”), vacated, 692 F.3d 899 
(8th Cir. 2012). 
 159. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 160. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming 
district court’s finding under a fair use analysis that the sound recordings at issue were “creative 
in nature”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976) (“The copyrightable elements in a sound 
recording will usually, though not always, involve ‘authorship’ both on the part of the performers 
whose performance is captured and on the part of the record producer responsible for setting up 
the recording session, capturing and electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and 
editing them to make the final sound recording.”); Gabriel Jacob Fleet, Note, What’s in a Song? 
Copyright’s Unfair Treatment of Record Producers and Side Musicians, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 
1258–59 (2008); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(emphasizing the low bar of creativity in copyright). 
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rights.161 Thus, Tenenbaum’s and Thomas-Rasset’s purposeful disregard for 
the clear mandate of copyright law deserves retribution.162 To do otherwise 
would invite erosion of this principle, vital since the Founding.163 
C. What It Got Wrong 
Though dedicated to applying the law as Congress enunciated it, there are 
many potential criticisms of the First Circuit’s Tenenbaum decision. First, one 
may argue that Judge Gertner was quite right to bypass remittitur in this case. 
Scholars have addressed the drawbacks of the doctrine,164 and Gertner herself 
explained that the plaintiff record companies were clearly determined to reject 
any remitted award.165 Practical assessments aside, however, the law does not 
support this sort of judicial discretion. The plaintiff’s right to a jury 
 
 161. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 499 (1972) (“The rule of law is important in 
the stability of society.”); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1173 (2006). 
 162. See F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952); All-Star 
Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Media Brands Co., 775 F. Supp. 2d 613, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that 
where willful infringement is found, copyright cases state that “a statutory award should 
incorporate not only a compensatory, but also a punitive component to discourage further 
wrongdoing by the defendants and others”); Marvin Music Co. v. BHC Ltd. P’ship, 830 F. Supp. 
651, 656 (D. Mass. 1993) (finding that to “vindicate the statutory policy” under Woolworth, 
courts may consider “the award’s deterrent value and the wilful [sic] nature of defendants’ 
infringement”). 
 163. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the 
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”). It should be 
noted that the Massachusetts constitution explicitly proscribes the judicial exercise of legislative 
or executive authority, concluding that the rule of law would be promoted by separation of these 
powers. See MASS. CONST. art. XXX. The impermissible judicial discretion applied in 
Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset by Judges Gertner and Davis, respectively, is precisely the sort of 
judicial legislation (or flouting of Congressional legislation) that the Founders sought to prevent. 
 164. See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages 
Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for 
Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1995) (noting that 
the process of judicial additur or remittitur does not adequately address the problem of “outliers,” 
or especially low awards, in punitive and non-pecuniary jury awards). But see Brad Snyder, 
Protecting the Media from Excessive Damages: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of Remittitur 
and Its Modern Application in Food Lion, 24 VT. L. REV. 299, 342 (2000) (concluding that 
remittitur will “play a prominent role” in controlling punitive damages in the wake of BMW v. 
Gore). Snyder also proposes some interesting revisions of the remittitur doctrine to improve 
efficacy, including adopting a more comparative standard (as opposed to the looser “shocks the 
conscience” standard) and being more explicit about how much of an award is excessive (i.e., 
whether the judge is applying the maximum recovery rule, the minimum recovery rule, or 
reasonable jury rule). Id. at 343–44. 
 165. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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determination of statutory damages is a matter of constitutional import,166 not 
to be undone simply by a judge’s determination that it would be impractical. 
A second, more plausible critique is that many, if not most, of today’s P2P 
infringers are uninformed about the consequences of their file-sharing.167 
Record companies have done their part to increase awareness through 
extensive advertising and awareness campaigns; however, those programs have 
gained only limited success.168 Thus, further work is needed to ensure that 
internet users are fully aware of the potential rights and penalties in a given 
action or download. This is especially necessary in light of the huge statutory 
range.169 If, as argued above, the range is constitutionally appropriate and 
awards within it should be accorded the substantial Williams level of 
deference,170 increased awareness is vital. Moreover, to a lone infringer of the 
Tenenbaum or Thomas-Rasset variety, even the smallest possible per-work 
penalty of $750 would likely be extraordinarily damaging when aggregated.171 
Reliance on congressional intent opens the door to further criticism of the 
statutory damages regime. Specifically, one might argue that reliance on 
legislative processes cannot justify statutory damages provisions, since lone 
infringers have a miniscule voice in the creation of new policies or reform of 
the current scheme if they feel penalties are too high.172 This is especially 
relevant when today’s individual infringers are compared to the record labels’ 
 
 166. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998). 
 167. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-216, at 3 (1999) (“Many computer users are either ignorant that 
copyright laws apply to Internet activity, or they simply believe that they will not be caught or 
prosecuted for their conduct. Also, many infringers do not consider the current copyright 
infringement penalties a real threat and continue infringing, even after a copyright owner puts 
them on notice that their actions constitute infringement and that they should stop the activity or 
face legal action. In light of this disturbing trend, it is manifest that Congress respond 
appropriately with updated penalties to dissuade such conduct.”); see also Kjos, supra note 53, at 
187–88 (discussing digital rights management as a more effective alternative to litigation in 
preventing P2P infringement, but noting that the RIAA engaged in extensive advertising 
campaigns that gave notice to consumers about the unlawful aspects of P2P file-sharing). 
 168. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 99 (“Although I have doubts whether this 
extraordinarily broad statutory range afforded Tenenbaum fair notice of the liability he might face 
for file-sharing, it is indisputable that section 504(c) clearly set forth the minimum and maximum 
statutory damages available for each of his acts of infringement.” (citation omitted)). 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 44–48. 
 171. See Barker, supra note 6, at 554. 
 172. See Opderbeck, supra note 56, at 1710 (“End users of copyrighted materials, at least in 
contexts such as popular music and films, lack the resources and bargaining position to pursue . . . 
change-based aversion strategies.”); see also Stavroff, supra note 9, at 708–20 (arguing that 
Congress must be the one to act on allegations of excessive penalties and that they should do so 
since the current scheme undermines the purposes of copyright). 
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lobbying muscle.173 Thus, the First Circuit denies the practical truth of 
congressional intent: there is no way for a lone citizen to effect meaningful 
change in a system heavily influenced by wealthy interests.174 Moreover, 
disenfranchised infringers will likely turn to developing new infringing 
programs instead of complying with what they see as unfair law.175 
 
 173. See Ory Sandel, Comment, Dastar Through European Eyes: Effects of the Public 
Domain on Transatlantic Trade, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 93, 124 n.210 (2004). The Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA) spent $1.25 million in the second quarter of 2011 alone 
in lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill. RIAA Spent $1.25M Lobbying Government in 2Q, YAHOO! 
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/riaa-spent-1-25m-lobbying-government-2q-
200138114.html. 
 174. See generally Tom Pavone, The Perils of Lobbying, NEW STUDENT UNION (Aug. 7, 
2011), http://newstudentunion.wordpress.com/2011/08/07/the-perils-of-lobbying/ (arguing that 
the minority interests protected by lobbying are those of the rich). 
  A couple of notes on perspective are warranted here. First, not all content providers are 
“big bad business.” Some are small-time musicians and artists who depend on copyright 
protection to protect the small revenues the internet can provide them. See THE AM. SOC’Y OF 
COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, MUSIC COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL AGE: A POSITION 
PAPER 2 (2008) (“Most music creators—individual songwriters, lyricists or composers—are, in 
reality, the smallest of small business owners. Copyright first and foremost assures their ability to 
protect and earn income from their creations.”) Where do they turn when their rights are infringed 
by the growing mass of content-hungry internet consumers? Congress crafted the statutory 
damages regime and the stronger penalties of the DMCA for their benefit as well. Their creative 
works are quintessential artistic expressions and are at the core of what copyright seeks to protect. 
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (noting that “some works are 
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others” and contrasting the value of “bare 
factual” works with “creative works”). 
  Second, companies like Google and other content disseminators are arguably the same 
type of “big business” as the content creators. See Mark Bartholomew, Making a Mark in the 
Internet Economy: A Trademark Analysis of Search Engine Advertising, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 179, 
219 (2005) (characterizing Google’s business model that “disseminate[s] advertising based on 
trademarked keyword search terms” as “big business”); Adam Metz, 2011: The Year in Google 
Acquisitions: Which Ones Mattered for Big Business, TECHREPUBLIC (Dec. 19, 2011, 10:30 
AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/google-in-the-enterprise/2011-the-year-in-google-acqui 
sitions-which-ones-mattered-for-big-business/718 (highlighting Google’s 2011 acquisitions, 
totaling in the tens of billions of dollars). They simply operate at, and profit from, the opposite 
end of creative expression—its dissemination. Instead of making money on the front end by 
owning copyrights, they make money on the back end by distributing content. When profit is the 
watchword, can any “big business” be trusted to protect consumer rights? Can the content 
disseminators strike a meaningful compromise, one that protects even small-time musicians from 
having their livelihood ripped away and cast out into the sea of the internet for all to take freely? 
 175. See Wu, supra note 143, at 682 (arguing that code designers may simply write new 
programs that exploit weaknesses or loopholes in current law as a substitute for compliance with 
the law itself). Wu further suggests that P2P file-sharing programs like Kazaa are “comparable to 
a temporary repeal of copyright laws for computer geeks.” Id. at 683. However, P2P file-sharing 
is no longer confined to the realm of “computer geeks,” as the current cases show. See Cross, 
supra note 6, at 1033 (listing various defendants in the RIAA’s litigation campaign, including 
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Further arguments against reliance on congressional intent stem from the 
rampant growth of copyright infringement via the internet.176 In an age of 
quick, easy copying and distribution of files online, it could be argued that 
copyright protections no longer comport with community values. Though 
Congress ostensibly speaks for the popular will, many consumers do not view 
their infringing conduct as reprehensible.177 Thus, the rule may have outlived 
its community and consumer support, and so it should be abrogated.178 Even 
though Congress purportedly addressed individual infringers in the DMCA,179 
it could be argued that they did not foresee the enormous growth of infringing 
capabilities for the general public. If Congress reassessed copyright statutory 
damages today, they might find that a distinction between corporate and 
individual infringers would comport better with community values. It would be 
wise for them to fashion damages ranges that are higher for wealthier, 
corporate infringers and lower for individual infringers. Providing separate 
ranges geared toward deterrence of different classes of infringers would reduce 
the likelihood of a case like Tenenbaum, where a lone infringer is subjected to 
enormous penalties.180 It can hardly be argued that Joel Tenenbaum needed to 
suffer hundreds of thousands of dollars in penalties in order to deter his 
conduct. 
However, compromise to this end can be reached without scrapping the 
strong protections afforded by the Copyright Act. By pursuing copyright 
enforcement and protection less confrontationally, copyright owners 
(particularly large record, movie, and television companies with critical public 
relations at stake) can protect their copyrights without alienating consumers.181 
Copyright owners cannot escape the danger of the prospect of free online 
content.182 Instead of attacking consumers and punishing them for desiring 
 
young children, the elderly, and the dead). The calamity facing the recording industry and other 
media industries grows exponentially as P2P technology goes mainstream. 
 176. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Daniel Reynolds, Note, The RIAA Litigation War on File Sharing and Alternatives 
More Compatible with Public Morality, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 977, 986 (2008); see also 
Moseley, supra note 142, at 335 (noting that file-sharing is commonplace). However, this does 
not mean that consumers are unaware that their conduct is illegal. See id. at 332. 
 178. David Opderbeck argues extensively that the social norms surrounding P2P file-sharing 
evidence a discrepancy between community values and current law. See Opderbeck, supra note 
56, at 1712–13 (arguing that P2P infringement subsists not only on social acceptance of the 
method, but also on principles of reciprocity within the anti-institutional open source coding 
community). 
 179. See supra note 167. 
 180. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 509 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 181. See Reynolds, supra note 177, at 983–86 (describing the public backlash over the 
RIAA’s confrontational tactics). 
 182. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1008 (D. Minn. 2011) 
(illegal P2P file-sharing “completely devalu[es] the recordings”), vacated, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 
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access to works, the smarter countermeasure would be to make legal, paid 
downloading and dissemination as easy as possible. Building on models like 
iTunes and Steam,183 copyright owners should make compliance with 
copyright as or more convenient than infringing conduct aimed toward the 
same end. By focusing on convenience rather than cost, copyright owners can 
come to terms with the reality of internet consumption: consumers do not 
always desire free content, but instead seek the easiest and quickest way to 
gain access to content.184 Cost, then, becomes only one factor among others in 
the quest to provide the most convenient access to online media.185 
Another possible criticism speaks less to the First Circuit’s Tenenbaum 
opinion and more to the copyright statutory damages regime as a whole. As 
technology progresses, it empowers both infringers and those who combat 
infringement. Though applications like Kazaa used encryption and other tactics 
to obscure the identities of those with whom files were shared,186 new 
technologies could be developed to overcome those techniques. If created, 
those technologies would allow record companies to track actual file-sharing, 
and thus actual damages.187 Upon such a development, Congress could then 
 
2012). Will Moseley notes that efforts at deterrence should focus on “marginal” file sharers (the 
more mainstream variety) and not on “hardcore” file sharers, who cannot reasonably be deterred 
because of their technological capabilities and unwillingness to use legal channels for access to 
copyrighted works. Moseley, supra note 142, at 344. 
 183. Apple’s iTunes is an incredibly popular program for accessing musical works, and much 
of its business success can be attributed to its policy of making music downloading fast and 
cheap—so cheap, in fact, that any one song usually can be downloaded for ninety-nine cents. See 
What is iTunes, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/what-is/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2012). Steam 
is a newer software application that allows users to download games and other content, but it 
protects copyrights by requiring users to supply credit card information on their user account in 
order to gain access. See About, STEAM, http://store.steampowered.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 
10, 2012). These models show how copyright protection can be maintained unobtrusively, almost 
unbeknownst to consumers at large. At the very least, these methods are far less intrusive than 
lawsuits against individual users. 
 184. See Seay, supra note 59, at 295 (promoting a new plan of enforcement that will allow 
users to “get legit” by paying monthly access fees to access unlimited downloading). 
 185. Of course, there will always be those citizens who insist on breaking the law. See 
Opderbeck, supra note 56, at 1711. Barring the untenable view that enforcement mechanisms 
must capture even the most determined infringers, one can see how focusing on convenience may 
go a long way toward stemming the tide of mainstream P2P infringement, which has the greatest 
potential to damage content providers. 
 186. See Henslee, supra note 33, at 13; Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, 
Media Neutrality, and New Technologies, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 427, 464 (2005); Johnson, supra 
note 135, at 378. 
 187. BitTorrent, a newer P2P software program that has gained wide mainstream popularity, 
does not protect anonymity as well as past programs because of the interest in faster downloads. 
See Goel et al., supra note 51, at 13. If faster downloads are more important to users than 
anonymity (and thus protection from infringement actions), the interests of convenience may, in 
the end, be the undoing of mainstream internet-based infringement. See Clive Thompson, The 
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reform the current statutory damages regime, allowing statutory damages only 
when actual damages cannot be proven.188 It should be noted, however, that 
this may do little to implement a practical reduction in the size of jury awards. 
Since the potential damages caused by lone infringers who liberally share files 
could be extraordinarily high,189 such a reform may make statutory penalties a 
defendant’s preferred alternative. 
Reform in the application of joint and several liability to the P2P context 
may also reduce the size and effect of statutory damage awards. This reform 
would allow one statutory award where both the P2P provider and individual 
infringer were joined in one action.190 If liability for statutory awards was 
shared between Tenenbaum and Kazaa, Tenenbaum would be subject to less 
crushing penalties. The practical consideration that Kazaa was essentially 
eliminated post-Grokster may destroy this avenue for Tenenbaum 
 
BitTorrent Effect, WIRED, Jan. 2005, at 151, 178 (describing the innovations of BitTorrent as 
“technology that is changing the landscape of broadcast media”). 
 188. See NIMMER, supra note 125, § 14.04(A) (“The availability of statutory damages under 
the current Act, even under circumstances in which plaintiff’s damages or defendant’s profits are 
susceptible to precise evaluation, represents a departure from the pertinent provisions of the 1909 
Act. Under that former law, the availability of statutory damages was to a degree discretionary 
with the court and turned largely upon the proof of actual damages and defendant’s profits.”); see 
also F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232–33 (arguing that resort 
to the statutory scheme was appropriate where the actual damages done were difficult to 
compute); id. at 235 (Black, J., dissenting) (stressing that resort to the statutory range should be 
allowed only where actual damages or profits cannot be proven). 
 189. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. Incorporating the “making available” 
right into the statutory scheme would all but ensure that actual damages from prodigious P2P 
infringer-users would be astronomical. 
 190. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162 (1976) (“Where the infringements of one work were 
committed by a single infringer acting individually, a single award of statutory damages would be 
made. Similarly, where the work was infringed by two or more joint tortfeasors, the bill would 
make them jointly and severally liable for an amount in the $250 to $10,000 range. However, 
where separate infringements for which two or more defendants are not jointly liable are joined in 
the same action, separate awards of statutory damages would be appropriate.”). But see Tussey, 
supra note 186, at 463–64 (noting that decentralized P2P applications avoid the knowledge 
element of contributory infringement by establishing a system where there is no way to monitor 
user transactions). 
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specifically,191 but could prove useful when faced with similar situations in the 
future involving new P2P software companies.192 
Finally, there is a very broad critique aimed not at the First Circuit or 
Congress, but at the record companies themselves. In light of the extremely 
bad press resulting from these suits,193 it may be sound business strategy to 
stop pursuing them and explore other options. Most defendants, like many 
Americans, are judgment-proof individuals.194 The lack of economic 
recompense combined with the ensuing public relations nightmare indicate that 
this may be a legal yet inadvisable method of vindicating the companies’ 
rights. This critique, it seems, has already been asked and answered: record 
companies have recognized the futility of suits against direct infringers and 
have stopped pursuing new ones (though without abandoning ongoing 
litigation).195 
In any event, obsolescence may counsel against these individual infringer 
suits far more than inefficacy. Streaming audio and audio-visual works is a 
new horizon in dissemination of copyrighted works on the internet.196 This 
method is the basis for such wildly popular services as Netflix, which millions 
of Americans use to view movies and television programs.197 Netflix, however, 
 
 191. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) 
(finding that P2P providers could be found contributorily and vicariously liable for their users’ 
infringing activities). After the Supreme Court’s finding, Kazaa settled its own lawsuit with the 
major record companies, agreeing to pay $115 million in reparations and convert into a legal 
download service. See John O. Hayward, Grokster Unplugged: It’s Time to Legalize P2P File 
Sharing, 12 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 2–3 (2007). 
 192. See NIMMER, supra note 125, § 14.04(E)(2)(d) (suggesting that, where jointly and 
severally liable defendants are joined in one action, one statutory award per work infringed is 
appropriate). 
 193. See Goel et al., supra note 51, at 26. Goel’s empirical analysis of the effectiveness of the 
music industry’s legal efforts concluded that the industry’s legal battles are advisable in addition 
to recommending educational campaigns and other more creative strategies to deter P2P 
infringement. Id. at 27. 
 194. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 606 
(2006). 
 195. See David Kravets, Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign, 
WIRED (May 18, 2010, 1:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/05/riaa-bump/; Greg 
Sandoval, RIAA Drops Lawsuits; ISPs to Battle File Sharing, CNET NEWS (Dec. 19, 2008, 5:01 
AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10126914-93.html. 
 196. Streaming allows a user to perceive a file while it is transferred. Streaming does not 
create a copy of the file on the user’s computer, at least not one that courts would view as more 
than a transitory, non-infringing copy. See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 
536 F.3d 121, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 197. See Netflix, Inc.: 2011 Earnings: Fourth Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes. 
com/top/news/business/companies/netflix-inc/index.html (last updated Jan. 26, 2012). The notion 
of protection by convenience may help stem the tide of internet infringement of film and 
television. The instantaneous nature of streaming allows customers to simply select a film or 
program and instantly view it. The convenience afforded by this quick and easy access to content 
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is a paid service.198 Just as was seen in the P2P context, paid services live 
alongside ones that illegally provide free access to copyrighted materials.199 
The growth of streaming and its potentially infringing uses brings to mind 
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., a case in which the 
Third Circuit had to account for a new technological development within the 
existing copyright scheme.200 The plaintiffs in that case were copyright owners 
in motion pictures, while the defendants were owners of a pair of video stores 
where patrons could buy, rent, and even view films.201 There, the plaintiffs 
sued for unauthorized public performance based on “novel application of 
relatively recent technological developments”—namely, in-store exhibition of 
videocassettes.202 The court skillfully interpreted existing statutory 
terminology in order to address the new use of VCR technology.203 It found 
that the term “publicly” as used in “public performance” refers to a place 
“open to” the public.204 This definition, according to the court, encompasses 
both performances to a large audience of the public and performances in an 
area open to the public, though there the individual audiences were small.205 
Thus, the Third Circuit was able to adapt to new technology in order to uphold 
the grounding principles of copyright. 
While analogy in the video-exhibition context was no large stretch of 
current copyright structure, the peculiar facts of streaming works suggest that it 
can sidestep many claims leveled against P2P infringement, thus preventing 
easy expansion or reinvention of existing statutes to address new problems. 
First, streaming does not involve making a copy of the work in question; it 
merely involves viewing a “performance” of another’s copy of the work.206 
Thus, no reproduction right is infringed, as is the case in P2P where each user 
makes a copy for himself.207 Furthermore, the performance viewed by the 
consumer is almost certainly not a public performance under the current 
 
discourages consumers from pursuing more time-consuming, though free, methods of access. 
Thus, the convenience factor here may indeed outweigh the cost factor in the individual 
consumer’s decision-making process. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41975, ILLEGAL INTERNET STREAMING 
OF COPYRIGHTED CONTENT: LEGISLATION IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 4 (2011). 
 200. 749 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 201. Id. at 156–57. 
 202. Id. at 157. 
 203. Id. at 157–58. 
 204. See id. at 159. 
 205. Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159. 
 206. See Aric Jacover, Note, I Want My MP3! Creating a Legal and Practical Scheme to 
Combat Copyright Infringement on Peer-to-Peer Internet Applications, 90 GEO. L.J. 2207, 2249–
50 (2002). 
 207. Id. at 2250. 
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construction of “public” in copyright caselaw.208 Though many consumers 
have the ability to stream a work, they likely view the works as individuals and 
would not qualify as “public.” Thus, the end consumer could not be subject to 
claims of unlawful reproduction or public performance.209 By foreclosing these 
common types of claims, record, film, and television companies have far more 
to fear from the popularization of infringement via streaming technology than 
they do from P2P infringement.210 
 
 208. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means (1) to 
perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of 
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to 
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by 
clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public 
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places 
and at the same time or at different times.”); NIMMER, supra note 125, § 8.14(C)(1)–(2). There is 
no caselaw on this issue as of yet. The relevant cases deal exclusively with the liability of a 
provider of streaming content, not the end user. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER 
TECHNOLOGY § 15:6 (Westlaw database updated Sept. 2012). In those cases, a provider escapes 
liability by making a “limited transmission . . . coupled with a limited end use of a work so that 
only the individual, family, or friends are involved” because such limited performance is not 
public “under either element of the definition.” Id. If an individual streams a work, he makes only 
a limited end use and does not even have the possibility of making a non-limited transmission. 
Thus, liability for an individual for a public performance violation is even less likely than it is for 
streaming content providers. 
 209. A broader acceptance of the “making available” right would help counter the provider 
who places his work online for huge numbers of individuals to access. See supra notes 133–38 
and accompanying text. Indeed, the rationale supporting the “making available” right in the 
streaming context is precisely related to arguments in favor of such a right in the P2P context. 
 210. Despite its factual peculiarity, streaming faces its share of legal challenges, including the 
recently proposed Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). This bill 
claims to strengthen copyright protections “[t]o promote prosperity, creativity, entrepreneurship, 
and innovation by combating the theft of U.S. property . . . .” Id. It essentially criminalizes 
streaming of copyrighted works by punishing those who infringe “by the distribution or public 
performance of a work being prepared for commercial dissemination, by making it available on a 
computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have 
known that the work was intended for commercial dissemination.” Id. § 201(a)(1)(C). This 
definition incorporates the “making available” right in order to escape the actual distribution 
requirement that is hard to prove in the streaming context. It also eliminates the “public” element 
of the public performance issue since it redefines public performance to include making works 
available to the public via a computer network. Powerful content disseminators like Google, 
Tumblr, and Wikipedia organized a “blackout day” in opposition to the bill, though their distaste 
for it relates to a different provision than the one at issue here. See Kirsten Salyer, ‘American 
Censorship Day’ Makes an Online Statement, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 16, 2011, 4:02 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-16/-american-censorship-day-makes-an-online-state 
ment-the-ticker.html. Yet the fact remains that content providers will not wait idly by as new 
technologies allow unfettered access to their content, but will instead apply their impressive 
lobbying muscle to marshal change in the regime to their benefit. 
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Certainly an analogy to Redd Horne could be made here. Taking the Third 
Circuit’s interpretation of “publicly” in the video-exhibition context and 
applying it to streaming is both natural and sound. However, the facts involved 
in streaming are even more extreme than in Redd Horne. Unlike the group of 
viewers in Redd Horne, in streaming the “public” is typically only one 
individual at a time.211 The works are also not “open to the public” in the same 
manner as in the video stores in Redd Horne. While at the video store, any 
member of the public could pay to view an exhibition,212 in streaming the 
viewer must have access to the internet, must be able to find the work online, 
and must be given access to the work by the provider. Ultimately, an effective 
response to infringement via streaming technology will likely require 
concerted efforts by Congress to strike a compromise between copyright 
owners who deserve economic benefit for their works and the ever-growing 
mass of internet users who demand constant, free, and open access to 
content.213 
These many criticisms do not reflect the shortcomings of the First Circuit’s 
Tenenbaum opinion. That court ruled on that case by applying the plain 
language of the law.214 They instead reflect possible deficiencies in the 
copyright regime itself. I do not conclude from these reflections that the 
current system is catastrophically defective or unbalanced. Instead, I mean 
only to say that the copyright regime must be ready to reevaluate and evolve, 
as it has done throughout its existence,215 in response to the growth of P2P and 
the internet as a conduit for content. At bottom, the primary defect of the 
current system is not its inability to adapt, but rather the blistering speed at 
which innovation and creation now outpace the adaptation process. 
 
 211. See Jacover, supra note 206, at 2249–50. 
 212. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 213. See Zohar Efroni, A Momentary Lapse of Reason: Digital Copyright, the DMCA and a 
Dose of Common Sense, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 249, 256–58 (2005) (discussing both 
Congress’s balancing act and a court’s struggle to apply it to anti-circumvention technology 
under the DMCA). 
 214. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 498 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 215. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 236 (1994) (finding that “[t]he digital future is the next, and perhaps ultimate, phase in 
copyright’s long trajectory, perfecting the law’s early aim of connecting authors to their 
audiences,” and that the best method of accomplishing this has been extending rights over time 
into new media). But see Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster 
and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264 (2002) (noting that 
the new challenges posed by digital technology may threaten the U.S. intellectual property 
regime). 
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CONCLUSION 
The problem of copyright infringement via P2P file-sharing applications is 
bound to grow. It will gain popularity with an increasingly broad set of internet 
users and thereby harm the copyright interests of record companies and other 
entertainment industries. The First Circuit’s opinion in Tenenbaum takes 
strong steps in favor of the rule of law and the vindication of copyright rights. 
Contrary to those commentators and judges who would allow broad discretion 
in altering jury awards of statutory damages in cases like Tenenbaum and 
Thomas-Rasset, Congress’s intent and the necessities of the internet age 
demand a more principled system through which copyright protections are 
quickly and meaningfully enforced. Nevertheless, the copyright regime may 
need to address new situations and adapt to the exigencies of copyright 
protection in the digital age. There is a growing culture of free access to 
creative content on the internet. If Congress wants to truly reflect popular will, 
it may need to reassess current statutory measures in order to realign with 
social norms. However, this in no way calls for the complete dissolution of 
copyright in favor of the insatiable desire for quick, cheap (or free) content. 
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the implied reasoning of its sister Circuit in 
rejecting a substantive due process attack on the jury award in Thomas-Rasset. 
As discussed previously, Judge Davis properly applied remittitur to the second 
jury award.216 Thus, the appeal from this third trial could not be disposed of by 
resort to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Though it was forced to 
address the constitutional issues presented, the Eighth Circuit properly looked 
to the First Circuit for guidance. In light of the purposes of copyright law and 
the statutory damages regime coupled with modern circumstances, the Eighth 
Circuit correctly overturned Judge Davis’s reduction of the jury award. While 
internet culture may be on the move, the only principled way to approach these 
cases is to give deference to the law as it stands. Legislative judgment must 
cause any necessary evolution in copyright. Judicial caprice is a shoddy 
guarantee for a legal right. 
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